پارس پروژه پرتال خدمات دانشگاهی
این مقاله ISI به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه امرالد مربوط به سال ۲۰۱۹ دارای ۲۳ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: H505
سال نشر: ۲۰۱۹
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): امرالد
نام مجله: Managerial Auditing Journal
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۲۳ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۱۹ : تأثیر یک شاخص عمومی تهور حسابداری بر تصمیمات گزارشگری مالی مدیران
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
The effects of a public indicator of accounting aggressiveness on managers’ financial reporting decisions
برای دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید
وضعیت ترجمه: این مقاله تاکنون ترجمه نشده برای سفارش ترجمه ی مقاله بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید (کد مقاله:H505)
مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع: برای مشاهده سایر مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع (با ترجمه و بدون ترجمه) بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید
چکیده فارسی:
هدف – هدف این مقاله، بررسی این موضوع می باشد که چگونه معیارهای ریسک حسابداری در دسترس عموم بر تهور تصمیم گیری های حسابداری اختیاری مدیران تاثیر می گذارند و این تصمیمات را برای عموم شفاف تر می کند….
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how publicly available accounting risk metrics influence the aggressiveness of managers’ discretionary accounting decisions by making those decisions more transparent to the public.
Design/methodology/approach – The experiment used a 2 * 3 between-participants design, randomly assigning 122 financial reporting managers among conditions in which we manipulated whether the company was currently beating or missing analysts’ consensus earnings forecast and whether an accounting risk metric was indicative of low risk, high risk or a control. Participants chose whether to manage company earnings by deciding whether to report an amount of discretionary accruals that was consistent with the “best estimate” (i.e. no earnings management) or an amount above or below the best estimate.
Findings – Aggressive (income-increasing) earnings management is deterred when managers believe such behavior will cause their firm to be flagged as aggressive (i.e. high risk) by an accounting risk metric. Some managers attempt to “manage” the risk metric into an acceptable range through conservative (incomedecreasing) earnings management. These results suggest that by making the aggressiveness of accounting choices more transparent, public risk metrics may reduce one type of earnings management (incomeincreasing), while simultaneously increasing another (income-decreasing).
Research limitations/implications – The operationalization of the manipulated variables of interest may limit the study’s generalizability.
Practical implications – Users of accounting risk metrics (e.g. investors, auditors, regulators) should be cautious when relying on such risk metrics that may be of limited reliability and usefulness due to managers’ incentives to manipulate their companies’ risk scores by being overly conservative in an effort to prevent being labeled “aggressive”.
Originality/value – By increasing the transparency of the aggressiveness of accounting choices, public risk metrics may reduce one type of earnings management (income-increasing), while simultaneously increasing another (income-decreasing).
Keywords Earnings management, Accounting risk metric, Aggressive accounting, Financial reporting transparency, Fraud risk indicator
Introduction
High profile accounting scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom and Waste Management, have brought companies’ accounting practices under greater public (and regulatory) scrutiny (Dellaportas, 2006). As a result, today’s managers not only must consider how discretionary accounting choices could affect their companies’ ability to achieve important performance benchmarks (e.g. meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations) but also their ability to appear ethical in their accounting practices (i.e. appear conservative and trustworthy as opposed to aggressive and opportunistic). Historically, it has been difficult for the public to gauge the extent to which companies use aggressive accounting techniques, as these practices often are not transparent (Lee et al., 2006; Hirst and Hopkins, 1998). However, in recent years, investment tools and other resources have emerged that now make it possible for investors and others to obtain information about the aggressiveness of a company’s accounting choices. The prevalence of big data has led to the development of such tools that utilize data analytics to assess risk and identify trends and outliers.
Conclusion
In recent years, various risk metrics and investment tools have emerged that now make it possible to gauge the extent to which companies use aggressive or potentially fraudulent accounting practices. In the presence of such information, managers must consider the reputational costs of making aggressive accounting decisions. Using an experiment, we examine how a public metric of accounting aggressiveness influences the tendency of managers to engage in earnings management. Consistent with deterrence theory, which predicts a lower incidence of behavior perceived as unethical when such behavior is likely to be detected by others, we find that managers are less likely tomake aggressive accounting choices (i.e. engage in income-increasing earnings management) when doing so will cause their company to be identified as high risk (i.e. aggressive). This result suggests that effective and publicly available riskmetrics have the potential to deter financial reporting aggressiveness.
| مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع |
|
مقاله انگلیسی با ترجمه در مورد حسابداری رفتاری مقالات جدید درباره تخلفات مالی |