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مقاله انگلیسی تأثیر اتخاذ داوطلبانه clawback (بازپس گرفتن هزینه ها) در گزارشگری غیر GAAP

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کد محصول: H463

قیمت فایل ترجمه شده: برای اطلاع از هزینه و مدت زمان انجام ترجمه با پشتیبانی وب سایت تماس حاصل نمایید (۰۹۳۷۲۵۵۵۲۴۰)

تعداد صفحه انگلیسی:  ۲۷

سال نشر: ۲۰۱۹

عنوان فارسی:

مقاله انگلیسی حسابداری ۲۰۱۹ :  تأثیر اتخاذ داوطلبانه clawback  (بازپس گرفتن هزینه ها) در گزارشگری غیر GAAP

عنوان انگلیسی:

The effect of voluntary clawback adoption on non-GAAP reporting

چکیده فارسی:

ما به بررسی تاثیر اتخاذ داوطلبانه مقررات clawback   بر افشا درآمد غیر GAAP می پردازیم. ادبیات پیشین به صورت مستند بیان می کند که اتخاذ داوطلبانه clawback   با افزایش هزینه های اظهارات غلط در درآمدهای GAAP، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی را بهبود می بخشد. با این حال، مدیران ممکن است به کاهش اختیاراتشان بر روی گزارشگری GAAP ، با افزایش اعتماد به افشای درآمد غیر   GAAP، واکنش نشان دهند. با استفاده از روش همسان سازی بر اساس نمره ی تمایل ، ما دریافتیم که بعد از اتخاذ clawback   فراوانی افشای درآمد غیر GAAP افزایش و کیفیت حذفیات غیر GAAP کاهش می یابد که این موارد با  دیدگاه استفاده فرصت طلبانه از گزارش های غیر GAAP تطابق دارد. بررسی های مقطعی اضافی به این تفسیر کمک می کند.

کلیدواژگان: clawback  ، حاکمیت شرکتی، درآمد غیر   GAAP، کیفیت سود، Dodd-Frank

clawback  :پولی که دولت یا شرکت از دست می دهد و سپس با مجبور کردن افراد به روش های مختلف (مانند پرداخت مالیات بیشتر یا اِعمال هزینه های بالاتر) مجدداً به دست می آورد.

Abstract

We examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Prior literature documents that voluntary clawback adoption improves financial reporting quality by increasing the costs of misstating GAAP earnings. However, managers may respond to perceptions of reduced discretion over GAAP reporting by increasing their reliance on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Using a propensity score matched sample, we find that non-GAAP earnings disclosure frequency increases and non-GAAP exclusion quality decreases after clawback adoption, consistent with a more opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. Additional cross-sectional tests help support this interpretation.

Keywords: Clawbacks,Corporate governance,Non-GAAP earnings,Earnings quality,Dodd-Frank

Introduction

This paper examines the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on firms’ non-GAAP earnings disclosure practices. Firms adopt clawbacks to recover executive compensation based on financial performance that is subsequently invalidated, most typically through an earnings restatement. Clawbacks are intended to discourage intentional misstatement of accounting information by imposing an ex post penalty on managers, and recent studies document that financial reporting quality improves after their voluntary adoption (Chan et al., 2012, deHaan et al., 2013). This evidence suggests that adopting clawback provisions increases the costs associated with misstating earnings defined under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, it is possible that managers adapt to this more restrictive reporting environment by disclosing financial performance measures that would likely be less subject to restatement, such as non-GAAP earnings. We therefore examine whether the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions affects the frequency and quality of firms’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures.

Non-GAAP (or “pro forma”) earnings disclosures are alternative earnings performance measures provided by individual firms that attempt to measure “core” earnings by making adjustments to reported GAAP earnings. Prior research finds that non-GAAP earnings figures are, on average, more value relevant than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003, Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002, Gu and Chen, 2004), but there is also evidence that these disclosures are used opportunistically by managers. For example, Doyle et al. (2003) report that items excluded from non-GAAP earnings are predictive of future performance, which suggests that these expenses are recurring and opportunistically excluded from core earnings. In addition, managers appear to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet earnings benchmarks (Black and Christensen, 2009, Doyle et al., 2013, Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).

While prior research shows that clawback provisions improve GAAP earnings quality, it is unclear how voluntarily adopting these provisions might affect the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure is inversely related to GAAP earnings quality, which suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures will decrease as GAAP earnings quality improves following voluntary clawback adoption. Alternatively, clawbacks serve as an ex ante deterrent of GAAP violations by increasing managers’ costs of manipulating GAAP earnings for their personal benefit. Managers may compensate for this perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion by voluntarily releasing non-GAAP earnings measures to investors, which suggests that voluntary clawback adoption will increase the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure.

The impact of clawback adoption on the quality of non-GAAP earnings is similarly ambiguous. On the one hand, Frankel et al. (2011) find that better corporate governance is associated with higher quality non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Since clawbacks are generally viewed as improving governance practices, one might expect an improvement in non-GAAP reporting quality following their adoption. On the other hand, managers may respond to the increased costs of GAAP earnings misstatements by using non-GAAP disclosures more opportunistically since non-GAAP disclosures are unlikely to fall under the scope of clawback provisions.1 The quality of non-GAAP earnings may thus decrease following voluntary adoption of clawback provisions.

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