این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI) به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۱ دارای ۱۵ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: H737
سال نشر: ۲۰۲۱
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: Advances in Accounting
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۵ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۱ : تأثیر اعتماد به نفس بیش از حد و توانایی مدیران در تصمیمات تداوم فعالیت و چرخش شغلی حسابرس
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover
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I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors’ decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors’ decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management’s remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company’s audit committee.
Keywords: Managerial overconfidence, Managerial ability, Going concern, Auditor-client relationship, Auditor turnover, Auditor termination
Auditing Standards require auditors to obtain an understanding of client management personnel as part of audit risk assessment procedures. 1 In addition, client management is an important source of information for auditors (Bhattacharjee, Moreno, & Riley, 2012). However, despite frequent interactions between auditors and senior management (i.e., the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer) in the audit process, there is relatively scant literature on whether auditors consider characteristics of client managers in their audit decisions or how managerial characteristics affect auditor-client relationships.
The purpose of this study is to examine how audit outcomes and the auditor-client relationship are influenced by managerial attributes. Specifically, I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence2 and managerial ability affect the auditors’ decision to issue a going-concern modification. I also examine whether managerial overconfidence influences the likelihood that an auditor is dismissed after issuing a going concern opinion. Lastly, I investigate if internal power dynamics between management and the company’s audit committee either strengthen or weaken the aforementioned associations between managerial overconfidence and the auditor-client relationship…
The study examines the effect of managerial overconfidence and ability on the auditor’s decision to issue a going concern opinion and the auditor-client relationship. While existing literature extensively investigates how managerial overconfidence affects firm policies and performance, there is limited evidence as to how it affects external monitors of the company. I focus on audit opinions and auditor-client relationships in this study as the auditors are an external party in a unique position to closely monitor the actions of management. I find that overconfident management increases the likelihood that the company receives a going concern opinion. However, further analyses provide evidence that overconfidence is associated with a higher likelihood of a going concern opinion only when overconfidence is not supported by ability. That is, the HAOC management is not any more likely to receive a going concern opinion than the HANOC management, while the LAOC management is more likely to receive a going concern opinion than the LANOC management…