این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI) به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۲ دارای ۱۹ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: h817
سال نشر: ۲۰۲۲
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: Advances in Accounting
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۹ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۲ :استراتژی های جایگزینی مدیریت و پاداش پایان خدمت
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
Managerial replacement strategies and severance pay
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This paper demonstrates the benefits to shareholders of offering severance packages to managers. We show that severance pay is not merely a way to coax underperforming managers to step aside. Rather, a manager’s efforts can pave the way for the manager’s successor, and thereby attract more talented potential replacements. We consider two settings that differ on whether or not the shareholder can fully commit to a replacement strategy. In both settings the shareholder makes replacement decisions based on output and the availability of a suitable replacement candidate at the end of the first period. When the shareholder can fully commit to the circumstances of replacement, severance pay serves solely to improve contract efficiency, because the probability of the replacement candidate emerging is influenced by the incumbent manager’s effort. In the setting without full commitment, severance pay not only improves contract efficiency but also allows the shareholder to expand the set of credible output–contingent replacement strategies. Generally, severance pay motivates managers to build value in the firm despite the possibility that in doing so, they make their own services obsolete.
Keywords: Severance pay, Contract design, Managerial incentives, Management turnover
Severance packages are an integral part of executive compensation. In a survey conducted by Lee Hecht Harrison in 2018(Lee Hecht Harrison, 2018; Tanaka, 2008),97% of responding organizations reported that they have a severance policy or practice. This number is a sharp increase from 79% reported in their survey in 2001. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the benefits to shareholders of offering severance packages. In what follows, we show that severance pay is not merely a way to coax underperforming managers to step aside. Rather, it is a way to encourage managers to undertake efforts that will benefit the firm in the long-run, even if those benefits will make potential rivals vie for the manager’s job. A manager’s efforts can pave the way for the manager’s successor, and thereby attract more talented potential replacements. To the extent that such efforts are easier for a potential replacement to recognize than for a compensation committee to measure, the manager’s effort creates a positive externality and severance pay becomes a way to realize this externality…
The incentive effect of severance pay has been a hotly debated topic. Severance pay has been described as contrary to shareholders’ interests and not consistent with the principles of optimal contracting. Previous studies have shown that severance pay can provide the shareholder with a tool to solve various incentive problems found in an agency setting. Our analysis adds to this body of knowledge and shows that severance pay can be consistent with the principles of optimal contracting.
We show that severance pay is not only designed to make it easier for underperforming managers to step aside, but to encourage managers to build value in the firm even if such value results in outsiders competing for and replacing them as manager. Severance pay allows shareholders to build value in the firm by incentivizing the current manager to build value that in turn attracts more talented potential replacements. To the extent that such efforts are easier for a potential replacement to recognize than for a compensation committee to measure, the manager’s effort creates a positive externality and severance pay becomes a way to address this externality…
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