مقاله انگلیسی ترکیب هیئت مدیره، ساختار مالکیت و عملکرد شرکت

این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI)  به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه اسپرینگر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۱ دارای ۱۳ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.

کد محصول: H701

سال نشر: ۲۰۲۱

نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): اسپرینگر

نام مجله:   International Journal of Disclosure and Governance

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)

تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۳ صفحه PDF

عنوان کامل فارسی:

مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۱ :  ترکیب هیئت مدیره ، ساختار مالکیت و عملکرد شرکت: شواهد جدید از هند

عنوان کامل انگلیسی:

Board composition, ownership structure and firm performance: New Indian evidence

برای دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید

دانلود رایگان مقاله بیس انگلیسی

وضعیت ترجمه: این مقاله تاکنون ترجمه نشده برای سفارش ترجمه ی مقاله بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید (کد مقاله:H701)

ثبت سفارش ترجمه تخصصی در تمامی رشته ها

مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع: برای مشاهده سایر مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع (با ترجمه و بدون ترجمه)  بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید

مقالات انگلیسی مرتبط با این موضوع جدید

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of board composition and ownership structure on accounting as well as market performance of Indian firms in presence of certain unique statutory provisions relating to independent directors and limits on ownership concentration. The study uses a sample of 265 non-finance, non-banking and non-PSU Indian companies of S&P 500 index and applies OLS models initially. Having identified evidence of a possible feedback loop, the study then employs instrumental variables and 2 SLS models to explore how firm performance is impacted by ownership concentration and board composition after controlling for firm-level and industry-level characteristics. A series of robustness tests are used to substantiate the findings from the main analysis. A two-way relationship and ‘nonlinearity’ are recorded between market performance and ownership concentration. The study shows that a moderate-to-high ownership concentration between 25 and 75%enhances firm performance and very low level of concentration adversely impacts the same. Performance is positively impacted by board size but not by board independence. The findings of the study become particularly important for legislators and investors in the backdrop of SEBI’s regulations fixing a maximum limit on promoter’s shareholding and existence of a minimum external directors in the board for listed Indian companies that might have an implication on firm performance from liquidity, agency and information asymmetry perspective. The study documents that an optimal shareholding concentration and large board size with internal directors rather than a high percentage of independent external directors leads to value creation in Indian context. The paper provides new insights onto the relationship between board composition, ownership structure and firm performance in the backdrop of regulations brought out by SEBI in this behalf. The findings of the study have varying degree of application in common law origin countries with strong regulatory framework for investors’ protection.

Keywords: Ownership concentration · Board size · Independent directors · Tobin’s Q · Return on assets

Introduction

 This paper investigates the effect of ownership structure and board composition on the financial performance of Indian firms in the presence of some unique regulatory provisions by SEBI,1 the Indian capital market regulator. SEBI prescribes a maximum permissible ownership by promoter shareholders to 75% for listed Indian firms. It also prescribes that the board of directors of a listed Indian firm is required to have a combination of inside and outside directors, with not less than 50% (33.33%) consisting of outside directors where the chairman is an insider (outsider). The concentration of shareholding of the Indian firms through chain and crossholding has been well documented by Ganguli and Agrawal (2009). Besides illiquidity of shares in the capital market ownership concentration creates expropriation of minority shareholders by keeping the corporate resources out of reach of the latter. Thus, too much concentration acts as deterrent for value discovery due to: (a) illiquidity and (b) agency problem arising from conflict of interest between corporate insiders and outside investors. Given the context, SEBI perceives that dilution of holding to some extent and presence of significant proportion of independent directors in the board might have a role in addressing ‘agency problem’ by influencing the managers to act in the best interest of the investors and take value enhancing decisions specially in the context of concentrated shareholding…

Conclusion

 This paper primarily investigates the effect of ownership structure and board composition on financial performance of Indian firms in the presence of some unique regulatory provisions by the Indian capital market regulator SEBI. These regulations pertain to the maximum permissible ownership by promoter shareholders and proportion of outside directors in the board. Such regulations are somewhat unique within the common law countries initiated with certain objectives in mind to ensure protection of minority shareholders…

مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع

دانلود مقاله بیس حسابداری

دانلود مقاله بیس رشته مدیریت

دانلود مقاله  انگلیسی در مورد عملکرد شرکت

مقاله انگلیسی مدیریت مالی

مقاله انگلیسی درباره ساختار مالکیت

مقاله انگلیسی در مورد بازده سرمایه

مقاله انگلیسی در مورد ساختار هیئت مدیره

دانلود مقاله انگلیسی با ترجمه