این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI) به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۲ دارای ۱۹ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: h799
سال نشر: ۲۰۲۲
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: Accounting, Organizations and Society
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۹ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۲ : ارتباطات سیاسی شرکت حسابرسی و گزارش های بازرسی PCAOB
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
Audit firm political connections and PCAOB inspection reports
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We examine the effect of audit firm political connections on the harshness of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports. Relying on Regulatory Capture Theory and Motivated Reasoning Theory, we show audit firm political connections, as measured through PAC contributions, are negatively associated with the harshness of Part I reports. Our results are robust to instrumentation and are not due to movements of personnel between the PCAOB and audit firms or improvements in a firm’s audit quality. In supplementary tests, we show the negative relation is stronger when we consider the directed nature of PAC contributions to members of Congress who exercise SEC oversight and robust to alternative measures. Finally, we consider the harshness of Part II inspection reports and find no association with political connections. Collectively, our results suggest audit firm political connections induce favorable influence over Part I findings of PCAOB inspection reports.
Keywords: Political connections, PCAOB ,Audit regulation, Auditor inspections
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate the auditing profession and enhance the reliability of financial reporting. An important element of the PCAOB’s mission is the power to inspect the quality of audit firm practices. In the past, audit firms were subject to system of peer review which was heavily criticized for not being independent because it was mainly coordinated through members of the audit profession.1 In general, it was argued that increased oversight by an external, independent regulatory body (i.e., the PCAOB) would improve audit quality (Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Mastolia, 2011; DeFond, 2010; Lohlein, 2016; Palmrose, 2006). Such an outcome is possible only if the PCAOB maintains its independence from the auditing profession over time. However, it is possible that political pressure by interest groups over the two decades since its inception could undermine the independence of the PCAOB (Aobdia & Shroff, 2017). In this paper, we examine whether the PCAOB has maintained its intended independent status based on an evaluation of audit firm political connections and annual PCAOB inspection reports…
There is a lack of evidence on howaudit firms may influence the PCAOB through political channels although they invest substantial amounts in various political activities including contributions via political action committees (PAC). It is an open empirical question whether this political activity has an impact on PCAOB decision making. Thus, we address this issue by examining whether audit firm political connections influence the harshness of PCAOB inspection reports.
We examine the effect of audit firm political connections through the lens of Regulatory Capture Theory and Motivated Reasoning Theory. We measure the harshness of inspection reports focusing on Part I reports and use PAC contributions to measure audit firm political connections. Our results suggest audit firm political connections are negatively associated with the harshness of Part I reports. To mitigate endogeneity concerns from correlated, omitted variables, we use a long-term measure of political connections, employ instrumentation, and include audit firm fixed effects, finding consistent results with our primary analyses…
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