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کد محصول: H460
سال نشر: ۲۰۱۹
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: J. Account. Public Policy
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۲۳ صفحه PDF
عنوان فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی حسابداری ۲۰۱۹ : آیا سرمایه گذاران تغییر در کیفیت حسابرسی را با توجه به تغییر (چرخش) شرکا حسابرسی ، درک می کنند
عنوان انگلیسی:
Do investors perceive a change in audit quality following the rotation of the engagement partner
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چکیده فارسی:
اگر چه بخش ۲۰۳ از قانون سربانس – اکسلی خواستار تغییر(چرخش) شریک حسابرسی هر پنج سال می باشد، اما ما نمی دانیم که آیا سرمایه گذاران، شرکا حسابرسی خود را ارزش گذاری می کنند یا خیر. این یک مسئله مهم است چرا که بسیاری از حسابرسان معتقدند که تغییر اجباری شریک حسابرسی ضروری نیست و در واقع موجب کاهش کیفیت حسابرسی می شود. ما نمونه ای از شرکت هایی را شناسایی کردیم که تغییرات در شرکا حسابرسی را در بیانیه های خود بازگو کرده اند و بررسی می کنیم که آیا سرمایه گذاران سهام پس از تغییر شرکا حسابرسی، تغییر در کیفیت حسابرسی را درک می کنند. ما دریافتیم پس از تغییر شریک حسابرسی، افزایش قابل توجهی در افشا سودآوری ایجاد می شود. ما همچنین دریافتیم که فروشندگان استقراضی از نظر درآمد پس از تغییر، کیفیت بیشتری نسبت به درآمد قبل از تغییر دارند. سرانجام، هزینه سرمایه گذاری سهام پس از تغییر شرکا کاهش می یابد. یافته های ما پیامدهای مهمی برای قانون گذاران، حسابرسان و سرمایه گذاران دارد.
کلمات کلیدی: چرخش (تغییر) شریک حسابرسی، افشا سودآوری ، هزینه سرمایه، فروشندگان استقراضی
Abstract
Though Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) calls for the rotation of the audit partner every five years, we do not know whether investors value audit partner rotation. This is an important issue since many in the auditing profession believe that mandatory rotation of the audit partner is unnecessary and may in fact impair audit quality. We identify a sample of firms that disclosed changes in the engagement partner in the proxy statement and examine whether equity investors perceive a change in audit quality following the partner rotation. We find a significant increase in earnings informativeness following audit partner rotation. We also find that short sellers regard earnings in the post-rotation to be of higher quality than earnings prior to the rotation. Finally, cost of equity capital is lower following partner rotation. Our findings have important implications for the regulators, auditors, and investors.
Keywords: Audit partner rotation,Earnings informativeness,Cost of equity,Short sellers
Introduction
Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) calls for the rotation of the audit partner every five years.1 An implicit assumption behind Section 203 is that rotation of audit partner enhances audit quality.2 Bamber and Bamber (2009) state, ‘‘. . . there has been little empirical evidence on the costs or benefits of audit partner rotation because of lack of data; . . . there is a real need for scientific evidence on the extent to which rotation yields the benefits regulators anticipate.” We respond to this call by examining equity investors’ perceptions of audit partner rotation. Our study is motivated by the paucity of empirical evidence on how investors perceive the effect of the rotation of the engagement partner on audit quality. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has examined investors’ perceptions of audit partner change for U.S. firms. In a review of research on audit partners, Lennox and Wu (2017, 32) state, ‘‘Overall, extant US studies provide somewhat mixed evidence on the consequences of partner rotation.
Investor perception of audit partner tenure reflects the net effect (costs and benefits) of mandatory auditor rotation and empirical evidence on investor perception could contribute to our understanding of the economic consequences of Section 203 of SOX.3 Ex ante, the perceived effect of audit partner rotation on audit quality is unclear. On one hand, audit partner rotation brings a fresh perspective to the audit and results of the interviews and field surveys indicate that partners believe that partner rotation improves independence in both fact and appearance (Daugherty et al., 2012).4 The improvement in independence is expected to enhance audit quality. On the other hand, partner rotation could have an adverse impact on audit quality due to increased information asymmetry due to less history of client interaction (Bedard and Johnstone, 2010). To put it differently, over time, auditors can gain firm-specific expertise which helps them to understand the client’s business and rely less on management estimates (Myers et al., 2003). Further, Daugherty et al. (2012) document an unintended consequence of partner rotation that may have an adverse impact on audit quality. Rotation may result in partner relocation but, due to quality-of-life considerations, partners may opt to gain new industry experience (retrain) in order to avoid relocation. In other words, partners’ preferred response to rotation is to choose to retrain to preserve their quality of life at the expense of audit quality. Thus, the net effect of audit partner rotation on the perceived audit quality is an open and timely issue.
As the disclosure of audit partner rotation is voluntary, we review the proxy statements of all firms available on EDGAR for the years 2002 through 2015 and develop an algorithm (described in Section 4) to identify firms that disclosed information on rotation of audit partner for that year.5 We are able to confirm rotation of audit partner for 53 observations representing 40 unique firms. We also make sure that the change in the audit partner occurred without the change of the auditor. To examine investors’ perceptions of audit partner rotation on audit quality, we employ a pre- vs. post-rotation design by testing differences in perceived audit quality measures between two years before the partner rotation and two years after the rotation (including the year of rotation). We use multiple proxies to capture investors’ perceptions of audit partner rotation: earnings response coefficient, short sellers’ response to earnings, and multiple measures of cost of equity capital.
We document several key findings. First, the informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient) has increased by about 21.86% during the post-rotation period relative to the pre-rotation period. Second, abnormal earnings in the postrotation period is negatively associated with the proportion of outstanding shares shorted as well as the extent of abnormal short sales, indicating that short sellers regard earnings in the post-rotation to be of higher quality. Third, the reduction in cost of equity capital following the audit partner rotation ranges from 80 bps to 150 bps. These findings are consistent with the notion that investors perceive lower information risk as a result of audit partner rotation. Overall, these results suggest that investors perceive the rotation of lead audit partner enhancing audit quality.
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