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کد محصول: H459
قیمت فایل ترجمه شده: برای اطلاع از هزینه و مدت زمان انجام ترجمه با پشتیبانی وب سایت تماس حاصل نمایید (۰۹۳۷۲۵۵۵۲۴۰)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۵
سال نشر: ۲۰۱۹
مقاله انگلیسی حسابداری ۲۰۱۹ : کمیته های حسابرسی و ریسک سیستماتیک: شواهدی از تغییرات قانونی تایوان
Audit committees and systematic risk: Evidence from Taiwan’s regulatory change
این مطالعه به بررسی تغییراتِ ریسک ِسیستماتیک شرکت های لیست شده در بازار سهام تایوان پس از تشکیل اولیه کمیته های حسابرسی می پردازد. در حالی که نتایج نشان می دهد که تغییرات در ریسک سیستماتیک در نمونه کلی شرکت های مورد بررسی ناچیز است، من دریافتم که حاکمیت شرکتی، تغییراتِ ریسکِ سیستماتیک در شرکت هایی با رشد کم را تحت تاثیر قرار می دهد. به ویژه، شرکت هایی با رشد کم، با سهامداران داخلی کمتر، با ساختار مالکیت هرمی، که توسط یک خانواده کنترل نمی شوند و یا توسط یکی از ۴ شرکت بزرگ حسابداری ،حسابرسی شده اند، تمایل دارند از مزایای کاهش ریسک سیستماتیک پس از تشکیل کمیته حسابرسی ، بهره مند شوند.
کلید واژه ها: کمیته حسابرسی، مسائل آژانس، حاکمیت شرکتی، فرصت های رشد، ساختار مالکیت
This study examines the changes in the systematic risk of firms listed in the Taiwan stock market following the initial establishment of audit committees. While the results show that the changes in systematic risk are insignificant for the overall sample of firms, I do find that corporate governance influences the changes in systematic risk for the low-growth firms. Specifically, the low-growth firms with lower insider shareholdings, with a pyramidal ownership structure, not controlled by a family, or audited by one of the Big 4 accounting firms tend to enjoy the benefits of experiencing a decline in systematic risk following the establishment of the audit committee.
Keywords: Audit committee,Agency problem,Corporate governance,Growth opportunities, Ownership structure
Existing studies generally support the notion that the presence of an audit committee plays an important role in improving corporate governance. For example, it is helpful in reducing fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000; Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004); enhancing the quality of financial statements (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Carcello & Neal, 2000; Klein, 2002); and reducing earnings management (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). In addition, prior work also documents that an audit committee having at least one member with financial expertise is more likely to perform its monitoring function well (Raghunandan, Rama, & Read, 2001; Davidson, Xie, & Xu, 2004). While there are numerous studies related to the audit committee, the question of whether or not the establishment of an audit committee leads to a decline in systematic risk is important but has not yet been answered. The main purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence in response to this question.
Management has an incentive to pursue its own interests at the expense of shareholders when a separation of ownership and control exists, and this agency problem could negatively influence a firm’s investment and other important decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). I consider an increase in systematic risk to be one of the negative influences arising from the suboptimal decisions that management make. The reason why the firm’s systematic risk is so important is because an investor who constructs a well-diversified portfolio is only concerned with the systematic risk, as the firm’s nonsystematic risk can be completely diversified out of the portfolio. How to ease the negative impacts associated with the agency problem has long been a central issue in finance, and enhancing the function of the audit committee is one of the important mechanisms used by firms to resolve the agency problem in the US and the UK.
There are two major characteristics of the literature on the audit committee. First, prior studies mainly examine the influence on the firm of appointing the members of the audit committee, or the influence on the firm of appointing a committee member with financial expertise. Second, prior research primarily investigates those firms in countries with a corporate-board structure based on the one-tier system, that is, the Anglo-American style. In contrast with existing studies, this paper investigates the impacts of the initial establishment of an audit committee on systematic risk for firms listed in the Taiwan stock market. The board structure of firms in Taiwan before 2006 was based on a two-tier system that consisted of separate boards of directors and supervisors. However, the revision of the Securities and Exchange Act in 2006 required that both firms in the financial sector and large firms establish an audit committee to replace the existing system of supervisors. As a consequence, the firms I investigate switched their board structures from a two-tier system to a one-tier system in response to the revision of the Securities and Exchange Act. That is, I examine the impact of the establishment of an audit committee due to regulatory change on a firm’s systematic risk.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it focuses on the issue of the relationship between the audit committee and systematic risk that, while recognized to be important, has not yet been addressed. Secondly, it examines the firm’s initial establishment of the audit committee as a whole rather than the appointment of individual committee members, or the influence of committee members with financial expertise. Third, this study investigates the establishment of audit committees by firms due to regulatory change as opposed to firms with an audit committee in a typical one-tier-system country.