پارس پروژه پرتال خدمات دانشگاهی
این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI) به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۱ دارای ۲۴ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: H697
سال نشر: ۲۰۲۱
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: J. Account. Public Policy
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۲۴ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۱ : قصور سرمایه گذاران نهادی و کیفیت حسابرسی
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
Institutional investor inattention and audit quality
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Abstract
We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that higher institutional investor inattention is associated with lower audit quality. We employ an inattention measure that captures the extent to which institutional investors are distracted by attention-grabbing events irrelevant to the focal firm. Results suggest that a higher degree of institutional investor inattention is associated with a lower propensity of a going-concern opinion, a lower probability of the auditor reporting a material internal control weakness, and a higher likelihood of the audit client misstating the financial statements. Further analyses show that these associations vary by auditor litigation risk, their workload pressure, auditor industry expertise, and analyst coverage. Overall, our findings reveal that while institutional investors play an important monitoring role, the distractions they face undermine the quality of monitoring they provide.
Keywords: Institutional investors, Investor inattention, Audit quality
۱.Introduction
Regulators, legislators, as well as market participants have long been concerned about the independence and competency of external auditors in fulfilling their professional judgement and performing due diligence (SEC, 2000; PCAOB, 2010). The question of when external auditors are likely to engage in substandard behaviors such as compromising independence, shirking effort, and loosening oversight, is thus of first-order importance to study as it can provide useful insights on the decision-making of investors and the policymaking of regulators (Harris and Williams, 2019). This paper attempts to investigate the question from a new perspective – institutional investor inattention.
Recent studies show that institutional investors are concerned about their portfolio firms’ information disclosure (e.g., Boone and White, 2015). Of similar interest to institutional investors, given financial reporting being the principal form of corporate disclosures, is assuring the credibility of accounting information provided by external auditors (e.g., Ball et al., 2012; Baylis et al., 2017). Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that institutional shareholders do intervene in firms’ external auditor selection and disclosure of auditor independence information.1 In this paper, we extend the literature to investigate the effects of institutional investors on audit quality from the perspective of investor inattention…
۶.Conclusion
This paper examines the impacts of institutional investor inattention on audit quality. Using the institutional investor inattention measure advocated by Kempf et al. (2017), this paper predicts and shows that audit quality deteriorates when institutional investors are distracted by exogenous events irrelevant to the environment in which the firm operates. The reduction in audit quality is not only statistically significant, but also economically large. Building upon our theoretical argument, this paper further presents evidence on the role of auditor litigation risk, their workload pressure, auditor industry expertise, and analyst coverage in mitigating the negative association between institutional investor inattention and audit quality…