این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI) به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۱ دارای ۲۳ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: H731
سال نشر: ۲۰۲۱
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: Journal of Corporate Finance
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۲۳ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۱ : تأمین مالی شرکت برای فرصت های سرمایه گذاری در دنیای مالکیت متقابل نهادی
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
Corporate financing of investment opportunities in a world of institutional cross-ownership
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Institutional cross-owners, specifically institutional investors with significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry, are becoming increasingly common in the United States. In this paper, we investigate and find that the presence of institutional cross-owners facilitates a firm’s financing of its investment opportunities, consistent with institutional cross-owners reducing the adverse selection concerns of those who provide capital for the investment opportunities. We then examine the conditions under which the presence of institutional cross-owners is likely to more significantly reduce adverse selection and thereby have even more of a positive effect on the financing of investment opportunities. We document that relative to transient institutional crossowners, dedicated institutional cross-owners facilitate more financing of investment opportunities. We also find that institutional cross-owners facilitate the financing of investment opportunities even more for firms with greater dependence on external financing, those with an opaque financial reporting environment, and those with more product market competition. Our paper offers novel insight into how a firm can benefit from the presence of institutional cross-owners.
Keywords: Institutional cross-ownership, Information advantage, Investment opportunities, Corporate financing, Adverse selection
The importance of institutional investors in the equity ownership of many publicly listed firms brought forth a large stream of research that examines the effect of institutional investors on various corporate outcomes. Some studies focus on the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, with the underlying assumption that greater ownership indicates greater influence (e.g., Kochhar and David, 1996; Schnatterly et al., 2008). The literature also considers different types of institutional investors based on their trading and holding patterns (e.g., Bushee, 1998), the degree of shareholder activism (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000), and investor location (e. g., Ayers et al., 2011). A newer literature focuses on the effect of institutional investors’ significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry; such institutional investors are labelled institutional cross-owners (e.g., He and Huang, 2017; He et al., 2020; Park et al. 2019; Ni and Yin, 2020).1 For the firm, having an institutional cross-owner as a significant investor introduces an interesting and important set of dynamics. A cross-owner has an incentive to maximize its own welfare through its ownership of multiple firms in an industry, though doing so does not necessarily maximize the welfare of each firm (Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; He and Huang, 2017; Backus et al., 2019)…
In this paper, we consider how an increasingly important characteristic in many firms’ shareholder profiles, cross-ownership by institutional investors, affects firms’ financing of investment opportunities. The answer to this question is ex-ante unclear. On one hand, by virtue of their informational advantage and influence over corporate actions, institutional cross-owners can help alleviate the adverse selection concerns of other capital providers. On the other hand, institutional cross-owners also have incentives to engage in self-dealing to maximize their own welfare.
Using a large sample of U.S. firms from the 1981–۲۰۱۶ period, we find robust evidence that firms with institutional cross-ownership are able to obtain more financing when they have investment opportunities, consistent with institutional cross-owners reducing capital providers’ concerns about adverse selection. In line with the well-accepted notion that dedicated institutional investors are better monitors, we find that effect of institutional cross-ownership on the financing of investment opportunities is stronger for dedicated institutional cross-owners, confirming that a reduction in adverse selection could help explain the documented association between institutional cross-ownership and the financing of investment opportunities. Further, we find that the effect of institutional crossownership on the financing of investment opportunities is stronger when there is more financing need, poor quality financial reporting, and more competitive product markets. All of these conditions tend to enhance the role of institutional cross-ownership in reducing adverse selection…
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