این مقاله بررسی می کند که آیا مشخصه های سازمانی که بانکداری اسلامی را از بانکداری متعارف متمایز می کند؟ منجر به رفتار متمایز در مدیریت سرمایه و درآمد از طریق استفاده از ذخایر زیان وام می شود. در کشورهای مورد مطالعه ، دو بخش بانکی تحت چارچوب نظارتی مختلف عمل می کنند: بانک های متعارف در حال حاضر مدل زیان وام “متحمل شده” را تا سال ۲۰۱۸ اعمال می کنند در حالی که بانک های اسلامی به اجبار مدل زیان وام “مورد انتظار” را اتخاذ می کنند. نتایج ما، شواهد قابل ‌توجهی را از اقدامات مدیریت سرمایه و درآمد از طریق ذخایر زیان وام در بانک های متعارف ارائه می دهد. این یافته برای بانک های بزرگ و زیان آور برجسته تر است. در مقابل بانک های اسلامی صرف نظر از اندازه بانک، وضعیت درآمدها، یا ساختار مدل زیان وام، تمایلی به استفاده از ذخایر زیان وام ندارند. این تفاوت می‌ تواند به دلیل مدل کسب و کار محدود بانکداری اسلامی، نظارت دقیق، و گرایش اخلاقی بانکداری اسلامی باشد.

Abstract

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank’s size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.

Keywords : IFRS,Regulatory capital management,Earnings management, Expected loan losses,Incurred loan losses

Introduction

A well-established stream of literature has identified the use of loan loss provisions (LLP) by bank managers in capital and earnings management.1 Their motivation is: to avoid regulatory capital adequacy charges that are incurred in falling below the minimum capital adequacy requirements; to increase earnings-based compensation; and to prevent debt covenant violations (see e.g. Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas, 1999; Anandarajan, Hasan, and McCarthy, 2007; Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Anandarajan, 2011; Moyer, 1990; Wahlen, 1994). The discretionary use of capital and earnings management practices is an obvious focus for standard setters, but little emphasis has been given to study the comparative use of LLP to manage capital and earnings across Islamic and conventional banks.

Capital and earnings management can be achieved through the exercise of discretion in the magnitude or timing of the recognition of certain loan losses and in the levels reported for LLP (Ahmed et al., 1999). Where banks might deliberately engage in capital and earnings management practices via LLP, this may compromise the quality of financial reporting and generate excessive agency costs (see Anandarajan et al., 2007; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).