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مقاله انگلیسی مالیات بندی نامتقارن، مسئولیت محدود و تعارض نمایندگی

این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI)  به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۱ دارای ۱۲ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.

کد محصول: H744

سال نشر: ۲۰۲۱

نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر

نام مجله:  Management Accounting Research

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)

تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۲ صفحه PDF

عنوان کامل فارسی:

مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۱ :  مالیات بندی نامتقارن ، مسئولیت محدود و تعارض نمایندگی

عنوان کامل انگلیسی:

Asymmetric taxation, limited liability, and agency conflicts

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Abstract

Current income tax systems are characterized by an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. This implies that the (effective) tax rate on profits exceeds that on losses. We study the contractural relationship between two parties (the principal and the agent). For example, such a relationship occurs if a franchisee (agent) contracts with a franchiser (principal) or when a new partner (agent) enters a partnership (principal). We focus on the effect of the agent’s asymmetric taxation on the principal’s optimal contract and show that the principal’s expected profit is a non-monotonous function of the agent’s loss tax rate. In particular, we show that the principal can be strictly better off if the agent is taxed more heavily. This result stands in contrast to the existing literature, which has only shown that lower taxation at the agent’s level increases the principal’s expected profit.

Keywords: Asymmetric taxation, Franchising, Limited liability, Moral hazard, Partnerships, Profit sharing

۱.Introduction

 Most current income tax systems are characterized by an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses in the form of loss-offset restrictions such as tax loss carryforwards. Asymmetric taxation means that gains are immediately taxed upon realization, whereas losses can only be carried forward so that a limited or no tax refund applies. In many economic situations, a contractual relationship between two parties (the principal and the agent) arises. Such contracts may involve losses for one or both the involved parties, if conditions turn out sufficiently unfavorable for the respective party. For example, in a franchise, the franchisee (agent) pays an up-front fee and obtains a share of the stochastic profit from the franchiser. It is obvious that the franchisee incurs a loss whenever his business was not successful, and his profit share does not cover the upfront fee. Similarly, partnerships have certain default characteristics related to both the relationship between the individual partners and between the partnership and the external world. Generally, the former can be overridden if the partners form an agreement, whereas the latter cannot be overridden in this manner. To enter a partnership, the joining partner (agent) pays a fee to the incumbent partners (partnership – principal) and receives a share of the profits. Again, the partner suffers a loss if the project outcome is sufficiently unfavorable…

۵.Conclusion

 Our study is motivated by two observations. First, current tax systems are usually characterized by an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. Second, incentive contracts may involve losses, if conditions turn out to be sufficiently unfavorable. Based on these observations, we investigate the combined effect of asymmetric taxation and limited liability on incentive contracts in a moral hazard context. Our analysis is based on a binary agency model featuring two risk-neutral firms that share the uncertain profit of a project. The agent’s profit share is subject to asymmetric taxation of profits and losses: if the transfer between the principal and the agent is positive, then the corresponding tax rate is greater than that for negative transfers…

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