پارس پروژه پرتال خدمات دانشگاهی
این مقاله علمی پژوهشی (ISI) به زبان انگلیسی از نشریه الزویر مربوط به سال ۲۰۲۲ دارای ۱۸ صفحه انگلیسی با فرمت PDF می باشد در ادامه این صفحه لینک دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی و بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله موجود می باشد.
کد محصول: m1255
سال نشر: ۲۰۲۲
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: The Journal of Economic Asymmetries
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۱۸ صفحه PDF
عنوان کامل فارسی:
مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰۲۲ : اندازه شرکت، بدهی شرکت، فعالیت تحقیق و توسعه، و هزینه های نمایندگی: بررسی اثرات پویا و غیر خطی
عنوان کامل انگلیسی:
Firm size, corporate debt, R&D activity, and agency costs: Exploring dynamic and non-linear effects
برای دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید
وضعیت ترجمه: این مقاله تاکنون ترجمه نشده برای سفارش ترجمه تخصصی مقاله بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید (کد مقاله:M1255)
مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع: برای مشاهده سایر مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع (با ترجمه و بدون ترجمه) بر روی دکمه ذیل کلیک نمایید
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates firm-specific determinants of agency costs, a relatively new and unexplored area in corporate finance. We estimate dynamic agency costs models, linking debt, firm size, and R&D activity to agency costs for a panel of U.S. information and communication technology (ICT) firms over 1990–۲۰۱۳. We adopt the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system GMM technique, which explicitly accounts for persistence, endogeneity, and unobservable firm heterogeneity. We provide the first evidence that our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover (Ang et al., 2000), exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with debt and a Ushaped relationship with firm size and R&D activity. These findings imply that agency costs experience a minimum value (in case of debt) and a maximum value (in case of firm size and R&D activity) and, therefore, that agency costs are higher at both low and high levels of debt, and lower at both low and high levels of firm size and R&D activity. We find that the level of debt of the average firm in the sample falls below the level that minimizes agency costs. We also document that, consistent with the agency literature, short-term debt provides an additional effective monitoring mechanism to alleviate agency costs. Our findings reveal that agency costs are dynamic in nature, mean-reverting, and persistent over time. This notion confirms the Florackis and Ozkan (2009) conjecture that managers behave as though an optimal level of agency costs exist that they pursue. Finally, we find a positive association between firm profitability and agency costs and a negative association between agency costs and firm growth. Extensive additional analysis confirms the robustness of our results.
Keywords: ICT industry, Agency costs, Non-linearity, Dynamic adjustment, System GMM
۱.Introduction
Building on the influential work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), the corporate finance literature has extensively analyzed agency conflicts and their associated costs. These costs arise because of the separation of ownership and control in firms creates conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. That is, managers often indulge in activities that enhance their personal benefits rather than maximize the firm value (Jensen, 1986). Baker and Powell (2005) classify agency costs into direct and indirect agency costs. Shareholders incur direct costs in the form of bonuses, stock options, audit fees, and other managerial incentives to reduce managerial opportunistic activities and behavior that results in direct expropriation of shareholder wealth, such as consumption of executive perquisites, shirking behavior, and insufficient effort. In contrast, indirect agency costs result from managerial failure to make profitable investments. This may occur in many ways. Managers may either invest in risky projects that yield a negative expected return or may fail to invest in projects that yield a positive expected return. Economists call these problems the overinvestment or asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and the underinvestment or debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977)…
۵.Conclusions
This paper examines the importance of firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size, debt, R&D activity, and short-term debt structure in explaining agency costs. We examine these issues with a sample of U.S. ICT firms from 1990 to 2013. We adopt a dynamic partial-adjustment model and conduct the analysis using the GMM estimation procedure that controls for endogeneity and firmspecific fixed effects. Most work in this area assumes a linear relationship between agency costs and firm-specific characteristics. We question this assumption and provide strong evidence that firm size, R&D activity, and debt affect agency costs in a non-linear and non-monotonic fashion. Specifically, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical work that documents a robust and consistent non-linear link between firm size, debt, and R&D activity and agency costs that includes an extreme point…
| مقالات مرتبط با این موضوع |
|
دانلود ترجمه مقاله انگلیسی در مورد مدیریت ترجمه مقاله در مورد مدیریت مالی ترجمه مقاله درباره تحقیق و توسعه |