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کد محصول: H343
سال نشر: ۲۰۱۷
نام ناشر (پایگاه داده): الزویر
نام مجله: J. Account. Public Policy
نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی (Research articles)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۲۲ صفحه PDF
تعداد صفحه ترجمه فارسی: ۴۲ صفحه word
قیمت فایل ترجمه شده: ۲۶۰۰۰ تومان
عنوان فارسی:
مقاله ترجمه شده : قانون ضد انحصار و محافظه کاری حسابداری: شواهد جدید
عنوان انگلیسی:
Antitakeover legislation and accounting conservatism: New evidence
چکیده فارسی:
ما به بررسی تاثیر نسل دوم قوانین ضد انحصار دولتی بر روی محافظه کاری حسابداری می پردازیم. ما روش جدیدی را اتخاذ می کنیم که بر اساس نگرش انتخابی ناشی از تصمیم گیری گروهی درونی شرکت اصلاح شده است. با تمرکز برروی دوره ای که در آن نسل دوم قانون ضد انحصاری تصویب شده است، ما به رابطه منفی میان این قانون و محافظه کاری پی بردیم. نتایج ما نشان می دهد که این قانون با کاهش دادن هزینه های بدهی آژانس ، تقاضای بدهکاران را برای محافظه کاری حسابداری کاهش می دهد.
کلید واژگان: قوانین ضد انحصاری ایالتی، محافظه کاری حسابداری، تقاضای بدهکاران، هزینه های بدهی آژانس
Abstract
We examine the effect of second-generation state antitakeover laws (ATLs) on accounting conservatism. We adopt a novel methodology that corrects for selection bias resulting from firms’ endogenous incorporation decision. Focusing on the period from when these ATLs became constitutional, we find a negative association between ATLs and conservatism. Our results suggest that ATLs decrease debtholder demand for conservatism by reducing agency costs of debt.
Keywords State antitakeover laws,Accounting conservatism,Debtholder demand,Agency costs of debt
Introduction
Academic interest in the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism generally examines this relation from the shareholder perspective.1 As a major type of capital providers, debtholders play a crucial role in affecting accounting conservatism, which has been demonstrated in prior studies (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003; Zhang, 2008; Ball et al., 2008a, 2008b; Nikolaev, 2010). Yet the impact of governance on debtholders’ demand for conservatism has received little attention in the academic literature. A major reason is that many governance mechanisms such as family ownership (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003) and board monitoring (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004) protect both shareholder and debtholder interests, making it difficult to differentiate between these two perspectives. Takeover market monitoring, however, is one exception. As prior literature suggests, takeover defenses such as state antitakeover laws (ATLs), though weakening shareholder monitoring of managers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), can better protect debtholder interests (Francis et al., 2010). Therefore, utilizing the unique, differential effects of takeover defenses on shareholder versus debtholder interests, our study attempts to examine whether and how ATLs affect accounting conservatism.
Based on Watts’ (۲۰۰۳) contracting explanation for conservatism, we develop two competing arguments for the impact of ATLs on conservatism, namely the ‘‘shareholder demand” view and the ‘‘debtholder demand” view. According to the ‘‘shareholder demand” view, conservatism facilitates efficient contracting between managers and shareholders in the presence of agency problems (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003). As the severity of manager-shareholder conflicts increases with takeover defenses (e.g., Faleye, 2007; Masulis et al., 2007; Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009), shareholders would demand more conservatism as a substitute shareholder governance mechanism to constrain management’s opportunistic behavior such as excess compensation payments and inefficient investments (Watts, 2003). According to this view, we expect a firm’s choice of accounting conservatism to increase with the strength of ATLs.