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کد محصول: H317
قیمت فایل ترجمه شده: برای اطلاع از هزینه و مدت زمان انجام ترجمه با پشتیبانی وب سایت تماس حاصل نمایید (۰۹۳۷۲۵۵۵۲۴۰)
تعداد صفحه انگلیسی: ۳۷
سال نشر: ۲۰۱۸
مقاله انگلیسی حسابداری ۲۰۱۸ : مالیات، غیر رسمی و تغییر درآمد: شواهدی از اصلاح مالیات در پاکستان
Taxes, informality and income shifting: Evidence from a recent Pakistani tax reform
بخشی از چکیده فارسی:
این مقاله به بررسی رفتار شرکت نسبت به پرداخت مالیات در محیط بزرگ با فشار کم می پردازد . با استفاده از تنوع آزمایشی ایجاد شده توسط اصلاح مالیاتی، که به طور قابل توجهی موجب افزایش مشارکت مالیاتی این شرکت ها نسبت به شرکت هایی که به شکل های قانونی دیگری مالیات پرداخت می کنند شده است، و همچنین موجب افزایش میزان مالیات بر درآمد در پاکستان در سال های ۲۰۰۶ تا ۲۰۱۱ شده است…..
This paper examines firm behavior to taxation in a low enforcement and large informality setting. Using quasi-experimental variation created by a tax reform, which increased taxation of partnerships substantially relative to firms of other legal form, and the population of income tax returns filed in Pakistan in 2006–۱۱, I document that treated firms report significantly lower earnings, migrate into informality, and switch business form in response to the increase in tax rate. The revenue loss caused by these behavioral responses is so large that by the third year after the reform the government was collecting less revenue than it would have without the tax increase. This implies that the new tax rate was on the wrong side of the Laffer curve and would not have been optimal under any social preferences. The richness of the data and tax variation permits me to decompose the observed responses into real and evasion margins and to identify fiscal externalities created by the reform on other tax bases. The welfare cost of the reform increases by around 40% once these externalities are taken into account.
Keywords : Efficiency,Income Tax,Informality,Tax evasion
The presence of large informal sector constrains taxation capacity of developing countries in two important ways.1 First, there is a direct effect as taxation base is limited to a narrow set of formal taxpayers. Second and more subtle is the indirect effect: governments in these countries tend to keep tax rates low fearing that increased taxation might unravel the already thin formal sector.2 Whether such fears are justified depends on the elasticity of the tax base, in particular on how likely the taxpayers are to exit into informality in response to a tax increase. There is quite a large literature that estimates the sensitivity of the tax base to the marginal tax rate using administrative tax return data (Saez et al., 2012), but unfortunately most of this literature is set in rich countries and the corresponding evidence for developing countries is limited. In fact, to my knowledge there is no micro-based study that takes into account the movements into and out of informality, which arguably is a more important margin of response to taxation in a developing country setting. This paper fills the gap by presenting evidence on the responsiveness of earnings, formality and business organization choices of agents to personal income taxation in Pakistan.
For this purpose, I exploit a natural policy experiment created by an income tax reform introduced in the country in 2009. Before the reform earnings of noncorporate firms – sole proprietorships and partnerships – were taxed lightly relative to earnings of corporations, and it was felt that the distortion was preventing the incorporation of new firms. The reform raised the income tax rate on partnership earnings to a flat 25%, thus neutralizing largely a partnership’s incentive to stay unincorporated. As an unintended consequence, however, it created a large tax rate variation within noncorporate firms: partnerships experienced on average a greater than five-fold increase in tax rates from 2009, while rates applicable to sole proprietorships remained unchanged in 2009 but reduced slightly from 2010 when their tax schedule was revised.3 These differential changes in tax rates over time and across very similar firms create an almost ideal experiment to study firm behavior to taxation in a low enforcement-capacity setting.